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Abstract  
 
 
One of the greatest legacies of the Sandinista Revolution was agrarian reform. Despite the 
amount of land redistributed, this process happened without any form of legal 
documentation to support the transfer of property from one owner to the next. The end of 
the civil war, the peace accords and the transition of power from left to right-wing parties 
produced conflicting policies that would bring high levels of complexity to the system of 
land tenure in the country. The case of the state-owned sugar mill, Ingenio Victoria de Julio 
– El Timal is of one the most emblematic examples of how slow and inefficient Nicaraguan 
institutions have been in solving land tenure issues in 26 years. 
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Introduction: 
 
 
 
Many people around the world first heard about Nicaragua in the early 1980s, 
when in the context of the Cold War the Somoza dictatorship was overthrown by the 
Sandinistas, a Marxist revolutionary movement with close links to Cuba. Profoundly 
influenced by the socialists ideas of Marx, Lenin and the experience of the Cuban 
Revolution only twenty years earlier, the Sandinista government set out to reform 
Nicaraguan society, a society that was characterized by an immense economic, social, 
and political gap between rich and poor. The Sandinistas understood that only a 
radical change affecting the social structure of the country would bring about the 
change Nicaragua needed in order to move to more egalitarian forms of social 
organization.  
With that in mind one of the first projects of the revolutionary government was 
reform of the land tenure system. The Sandinistas were determined in carrying out a 
project of land redistribution through which the rural communities of Nicaragua could 
be developed and better integrated into the economic activities of the country. 
Unfortunately, neither the government nor the people were ready to undergo such a 
big change. Despite of the efforts the Sandinistas made to make the agrarian reform 
work, it was met with great opposition from many of the peasant farmers in the 
countryside; furthermore, the economic conditions and the civil war made it hard for 
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the government to allocate resources to the project, which little by little became harder 
to manage.  
Beginning in 1990, after the Sandinistas lost the presidential election to the UNO 
Coalition Party, the new administration led by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro drove the 
country in a very different direction: neoliberalism. Despite of the new governmental 
policies to reduce the role of the government in the economic arena, Chamorro’s 
government made a compromise to continue what the Sandinistas had started and to 
grant property titles to people who had been benefitted from the agrarian reform. It 
was 1991 when the compromise was made; it has been twenty-five years since the 
compromise was signed and there is still considerable work to do in order to solve land 
tenure issues in the country. 
  This paper analyzes the case of one of the biggest industrial sugar mills that 
operated in the country during the Sandinista government, Ingenio Victoria de Julio-El 
Timal, to understand how conflicts over land came to be in post-civil war Nicaragua. 
The formerly state-owned enterprise is one of the most emblematic cases related to 
land tenure issues in Nicaragua. A great deal of attention has been given to the mill 
due to the violent outbreaks that have taken place over time in connection to property 
disputes. This case study outlines the policies with which the governments, starting in 
1990 to the present, has dealt with the problem of land distribution and what the effects 
these policies have had on the inhabitant of the mill.   From there, I will try to draw 
some conclusions as to why it has taken the government such a long time to come up 
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with a response to the issues regarding land tenure in the country, a common problem  
among developing countries with similar of land redistribution disparities.   
The structure of the paper is as follows: the first part comprises a historical 
narrative of the status of land tenure before and during the revolution; the second part 
explores the case of Ingenio Victoria de Julio – El Timal, while looking at the evolution 
of land tenure issues as governments changed; and the third part is made up of my 
conclusions, where I present some factors that might be useful in explaining the slow 
process of land titling in Nicaragua.   
 
Historical Context: 
 
 
The Nicaraguan economy has historically been based on agriculture. Starting in 
the 1950s Nicaraguan economy focused on the production of popular cash crops for 
export; dominated by the production of coffee, Nicaraguan agricultural practices began 
to diversify, cultivating other popular crops, such as sugar cane and cotton. This kind 
of harvest requires intensive labor and vast amounts of agricultural land in order to 
produce significant revenue. With the intention of creating stable and profitable 
businesses based on the several cash crops Nicaragua was able to produce, the best 
agricultural lands of the country were reserved for the harvest of export crops; the 
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areas assigned for national consumption were less fertile areas1.  
Once the coffee, sugar cane and cotton plantations had been successfully 
established and as they became profitable enterprises, new crops were introduced into 
the agricultural system, namely, banana and tobacco. The strong orientation toward 
development through the expansion of export-oriented agricultural production led to 
the creation of a system of production that was highly exploitive of the land, as well as 
the workers. In this scenario, the campesinos, or peasant farmers, who were unable to 
compete with the big, capitalist plantations that were now occupying the lands that 
had once belonged to them, were forced to move to the wetlands of the Atlantic,2 an 
area far from being as productive as their former properties had been.   
Land tenure in Nicaragua was configured to a great extent by the economic 
model of export-led growth. "In 1971, farms no larger than 10 manzanas, or 
approximately 7 hectares, of land accounted for 41.6% of the total number of farms, but 
were only 2.2% of the total area; in contrast, larger farms of 500 manzanas, or almost 
350 hectares of land, represented 1.8% of the farms, but held 47.6% of land in the 
country."3 This unequal distribution of land meant that many rural families who were 
landless were absorbed into the system as rural workers in the big plantations. With a 
                                                        
1 Instituto Nicaragüense de Reforma Agraria, La Revolución y el Campo, Publicacion para 
los Brigadistas dela Cruzada Nacional de Alfabetización, Nicaragua, 1980. 
 
2 Jaime Wheelock-Román, “Enfoque del FSLN sobre el Problema Agrario.” In La Reforma 
Agraria Sandinista: 10 Años de la Revolución en el Campo, 39-68.1st ed. Managua: 
Vanguardia, 1990. 
 
3 Instituto Nicaragüense de Reforma Agraria, La Revolución y el Campo, 4. 
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growing gap between social groups—those who were landowners, rural capitalists, 
and those who were landless—this economic system also led to the unequal 
development of different economic sectors of the Nicaraguan economy.  Under such 
circumstances the role of Nicaraguan industries was undermined by the prominent 
role agriculture came to have in governmental policy, by creating more favorable 
conditions for the growth and development of agricultural activities than those related 
to industrial production.4   
Unlike other parts of Latin America, the agrarian structure of Nicaragua did not 
have strong feudal relations in which confrontations between campesinos and 
landholders, or terratenientes, were able to flourish. Neither did it have large 
plantations controlled by foreign capital that would spark nationalism among the 
workers to rebel against the system. Lastly, the Nicaraguan peasantry lacked a 
collective consciousness of being part of a greater indigenous community that had 
rights over the lands that had been under their control in pre-Columbian times, with 
the exception of indigenous groups living in the Atlantic Coast region of Nicaragua.5 
These characteristics of Nicaraguan rural life describe important obstacles in the 
creation of an effective and strong peasant movement that could potentially undermine 
the agriculturally based economic system.   
                                                        
4 Ibid., 5. 
5 Eduardo Baumeister, “Políticas y Acciones de Reforma Agraria y Desarrollo Rural (1979-
1989). In Estructura y Reforma Agraria en Nicaragua (1979-1989),173-203. Managua: 
Ediciones CDR-ULA,1998. 
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Under the export-led growth model, the Nicaraguan economy was able to grow 
steadily for twenty-seven years. The effects of the economic system were manifested in 
the creation of an economically polarized society, which consequently modified the 
social structure of the country. The one piece of Nicaraguan society that had been left 
unchanged was the government. The Somoza regime had been established in 1936, by 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia, the first in the Somoza family to become president of 
Nicaragua6; his sons, Luis and later on, Anastasio Somoza Debayle would eventually 
continue their father’s legacy, establishing a family dictatorship that would rule 
Nicaragua for over forty years. During that period, Nicaragua underwent a 
contradictory process of modernization. On the one hand, the state aimed at creating a 
renewed productive force; on the other hand, it retained an obsolete authoritarian 
political system that was unable to legitimately coexist with the social transformations 
of the modernizing Nicaraguan society7.   
The Sandinista Revolution 
 
The entrenched polarization of the country, as well as losing key international 
allies such as the United States8, led to a popular insurrection led by the Sandinistas in 
                                                        
6 Arturo Cruz S., “¿Qué Ocurrió en Nicaragua?, Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el 
Desarrollo, 2005. Accessed December 15th 2015, 
http://memoriacentroamericana.ihnca.edu.ni/index.php?id=251&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news
%5D=1825&cHash=491c6ac43e8257c1402b3c57ad372a90 
 
7 Baumeister, Estructura y Reforma Agraria en Nicaragua (1979-1989),175. 
 
8 The Somoza dictatorship had a tradition of having close economic and political ties to the 
United States; however, during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the  United 
  7 
 
 
 
1979 that overthrew the Somozas. With the revolution, Nicaragua was now able to 
modify not only the political system into more democratic practices, but also the 
socioeconomic conditions of the country by laying out an economic system that would 
do away the deep disparities between Nicaraguan economic classes9.   
It was clear that in order for a real transformation to take place within the 
socioeconomic structure of the country, big changes would need to take place at an 
economic level. In order to do this, the Sandinista government was set to carry out an 
agrarian reform through which land would be massively redistributed in favor of the 
landless peasantry by eliminating the large rural estates that perpetuated the 
campesinos' condition as landless agrarian workers under the premise of "la tierra es de 
quien la trabaja", land belongs to those who work it.10. In this sense, the agrarian reform 
was a political tool of the Sandinistas to expand their support base in the countryside, 
as they represented the largest social group in 1980s Nicaragua.  
The first properties to be confiscated were lands that had belonged to the 
Somozas and their inner circle. These expropriations allowed for the creation of a land 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
States abandoned its friendly position towards repressive regimes in Latin America, 
including the Somozas in Nicaragua. The lack of support from the United States would play 
a key role in exacerbating the conditions under which the Sandinista revolution would 
flourish.  
“Carter en la Historia de Nicaragua,” La Prensa, July 1, 2014 accessed April 6, 2016, 
http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2014/01/06/politica/176948-carter-en-la-historia-de-
nicaragua  
 
9 Cruz, “¿Qué Ocurrió en Nicaragua?, 13. 
 
10 Wheelock-Román, La Reforma Agraria Sandinista, 44. 
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bank from which all land redistributions were to be conducted.11 One of the significant 
features of the Sandinista agrarian reform was the establishment of peasant 
cooperatives, known as UPES, to administer land as well as all the means needed to 
work it; as many as 1200 cooperatives were created in a ten year period. Parallel to the 
first land redistributions12, the government had planned to expand the industrial 
production of sugar cane, vegetable greens, cacao, African oil palm as well as the cattle 
industry by developing governmental projects particularly designed to achieve such 
goal, which would allow the country to expand its export-led economy. With the 
creation of national projects in the areas of El Timal, Sébaco, Río San Juan and Chiltepe, 
the government was also aiming at transforming rural temporary workforce into 
permanent, agroindustrial workers13.  
It was not long before the revolutionary government began to face opposition 
from its neighbors in the north. In the mid 1980s, the United States established a trade 
embargo on Nicaragua; at the same time, resistance groups were becoming more 
organized into formal institutions leading to the outbreak of civil war. This period had 
a critical impact in course of the agrarian reform, especially since the rural areas of the 
                                                        
11 Ibid.,51. 
 
12 Ibid.,55. 
 
13 Vera Gianotten, Ton de Wit and Rodrigo Montoya, “Problemas en el Campo 
Nicaragüense”. In Nicaragua: Cuestión Agraria y Participación Campesina, 79-92. Lima: 
DESCO, 1987. 
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country became the main stage for the armed conflict14. The war also helps explain the 
deteriorating conditions of the economy, due to the embargo and allocation of workers 
into the defense sector.  
As the crisis deepened the demand for land grew. At this point it was more than 
clear that the former Somoza lands would not be enough to supply for all the landless 
peasants in the country15. This meant that the government would have to confiscate 
land from owners who could not be associated with the Somoza regime. In order to 
remain loyal to the frame of national unity that had emerged during the revolution, the 
Sandinistas thought the less problematic solution to approach the issue of supply was 
to expropriate idle lands, meaning land that was not being worked, or inhabited by its 
owners. 16The civil war came to play a key role in the dynamic of the agrarian reform. 
From this point forward the reform took a more political role which justified the 
expropriation of counterrevolutionaries' lands, the redistribution of such lands to 
Sandinista-friendly peasants, and the incorporation of peasant cooperatives into 
military units, as well as the creation of communal areas to which peasants had been 
evacuated17.   
In the last months of the Sandinista government there was a tendency towards 
                                                        
14 Cruz, “¿Qué Ocurrió en Nicaragua?, 17. 
 
15 Gianotten, Cuestión Agraria y Participación Campesina, 81. 
 
16 Wheelock-Román, La Reforma Agraria Sandinista, 56. 
 
17 Baumeister, Estructura y Reforma Agraria en Nicaragua (1979-1989),180. 
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the distribution of land to individual owners rather than rural cooperatives; 
nonetheless, when looking at the total percentage of land that was redistributed, 72% 
was done in the form of communal property under the ownership of peasant 
cooperatives18. Despite of the changing nature of the agrarian reform, especially in the 
context of civil war, the Sandinista government was able to redistribute some land. In 
1971 landless and small peasant farmer families accounted for 64% of total families in 
the country; by the end of the period of the Sandinista administration the number of 
landless families was reduced to 40%19.   
Toward the end of the Sandinista revolutionary period (1984-1989), the 
government negotiated with the peasant resistance movement, popularly referred to as 
“La Contra”, to stop the seizure of their land as part of the ceasefire; on the one hand 
this limited the government's ability to accumulate land, on the other hand it led to a 
more rational use of the land that was already available in the land bank. With this in 
mind, the government kept redistributing land, collectively as well as individually, and 
even added new beneficiaries to the program. Members of the peasant resistance and 
of the Sandinista army, who were beginning to be demobilized, were now to be 
included in the pool of people waiting for land20.  
                                                        
18 Ibid., 191. 
 
19 Ibid., 186. 
 
20 Jan P. de Groot and Jan Plantinga, “Perspectivas de la Reforma Agraia Nicaragüense en los 
Años ‘90s”, Managua:UNAN/Departamento de Economía Agrícola,1990. 
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In an effort to revert the economic crisis Nicaragua was undergoing in 1989, the 
Sandinistas carried out a number of policies that allowed for some improvement in the 
economy. They were able to increase agricultural exports by favoring large and 
medium businesses in the field, reducing the peasantry's role in the export-led 
economy. The government tried to push farmers into a form of farming dedicated to 
the production of agricultural products for national consumption; nonetheless, with the 
lack of an agrarian policy directed towards the development of the rural areas, it was 
really hard for the peasants to get anything done, forcing the government to import 
most of the goods for national consumption21. This led to a continuation of an 
unemployment and indebtedness spiral that did not seem to have an end.  
1990 – 2000s. 
 
The new government, the UNO coalition, led by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro 
had enormous tasks ahead of it: stabilize the economy, continue the demobilization 
process, and to finalize the land redistribution process that had begun under the 
previous administration. Chamorro's government, under the conditions of the 
Washington Consensus, began reforming the state by reducing its role in the economy. 
This would have significant consequences in the process of demobilization and land 
redistribution, which required a strong, central state. Yet the opposite was happening 
in Nicaragua.  
Doña Violeta, as President Chamorro is commonly referred to, made it clear that 
                                                        
21 Ibid., 6-7. 
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the peasants who had received land during the Sandinista government would be able 
to keep their land. Nonetheless, her government opened a channel, by issuing the 11-90 
decree, for people whose land had been expropriated under the Sandinistas, to have 
the government analyze their cases and determine whether the expropriation was 
carried out in an adequate, legal manner. Under this decree, nearly every parcel of 
land, with the exception of land once belonging to the Somozas, could be brought 
under government scrutiny. This situation created great insecurity among peasant 
families who had been granted land but no property titles. The Chamorro 
administration assured campesinos no evictions would take place unless the 
expropriation had been done unlawfully. Peasants would be allowed to keep their 
land, and the government would compensate the previous owner either by paying for 
the property, or by giving them new land22.  
The 10-90 decree also allowed the state to lease state-owned lands to private 
actors as an incentive to increase agricultural production23. Private capital could  
expand their agricultural businesses focused on exportation. This process had a 
negative impact for the peasant population, who unlike the private sector, were unable 
to accumulate capital, workforce and techniques that would allow them to become a 
significant actor within the economy. In this sense, the Nicaraguan peasantry had an 
unfavorable position that made them highly dependent, in financial terms, on third 
                                                        
22 Ibid., 6. 
 
23 Ibid.,6. 
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parties, making production even more expensive24. In the long run, these changes 
would lead to a reversal in the conditions of campesinos, who would once again be 
used as cheap labor and as providers of cheap food for national consumption, just as it 
had been during Somoza times.  
Despite of the Chamorro government plans to continue distributing land, there 
were pressing concerns about the completion of such plans. First, it is important to 
keep in mind that the economic situation of the country had been especially tough on 
the peasant population, leaving many of them seriously indebted. While land titling is 
an important step in guaranteeing the peasant farmers' ability to survive as well as 
solving property conflicts, this would only have a positive effect on farmers who were 
able to retain their property under their authority. The level of indebtedness many 
farmers were experiencing could, and would—in many cases—lead to a counter 
process of agrarian consolidation, helping reverse the process of land distribution.  
A second element to consider while studying land tenure issues in Nicaragua is 
the actual supply of land. The land bank was made up of a limited and rather small 
stock of land. The most viable solution to respond to this problem would be to transfer 
state land (from state enterprises) to landless families. When analyzing this option, it 
fits the economic model of the UNO government to perfection. Privatizing these lands 
would provide the government with resources to balance its budget while also 
                                                        
24 Ibid.,8. 
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allowing for the reinforcement of a capitalist class25. Nonetheless, this measure was not 
welcomed by agrarian workers who feared a reversal to pre-revolutionary conditions. 
The problem of legal land tenure in Nicaragua only became more complex as 
time passed. The Sandinistas had massively redistributed land, but did not provide the 
new owners with the respective legal documents that could backup their tenure; this 
task was to be carried out by the following administration, doña Violeta Barrios de 
Chamorro's. Nonetheless, during this period, property issues were aggravated by the 
implementation of neoliberal policies that cut back on government investment and 
pushed for the privatization of state-owned assets. Additionally, the demilitarization 
process and demobilization of the armed forces of the country, as well as the Chamorro 
government policies to revise expropriation and grant land returns to former owners, 
only deepened and entangled land tenure issues further 26. 
Historically, land distribution and tenure issues in Nicaragua have been 
exploited by the political class in their pursuit of power. 1995 pointed towards a 
different outcome; The Carter administration and the Nicaraguan government, during 
the last years of the Chamorro government, tried to directly address the property 
issues in the country by putting together legislation that could be used to regulate any 
kind of commercial or legal action in regards to land that had once been owned by the 
                                                        
25 Ibid.,11-12. 
 
26 Equipo Nitlapán-Envío, “Propiedad:El Hilo Rojo,”Envío 180, March 1997:accessed Feb. 
14, 2016, http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/272 
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state.27 In spite of having issued Law 209, Ley de la Propiedad, the government 
achieved little progress in solving the issue. 1996 was an election year, and as expected, 
one of the candidates ran a campaign largely based on the land tenure issue. Arnoldo 
Alemán, who would become president of Nicaragua in 1997, was that candidate. He 
further politicized the property issues by questioning the legality with which 
expropriations and returns of land were carried out by the two previous 
administrations.  
Alemán had a very simplistic view on the issue. He proposed to solve the 
problem by doing two things: first, he wanted to give all the poor people who had 
benefitted from the agrarian reform property titles to their land; and second, he wanted 
to carry out a review of all the expropriations and land returns that had been done in 
such a way that appeared illegal; in those cases, where the appropriate legal grounds to 
justify the proceedings were not present, the benefactors would have to either return 
their property to the state or pay for the property at market value.28The Sandinistas, 
who still remained a force in government by holding several seats in the National 
Assembly, agreed to his policies on the property issue; however, they recommended 
poor people's titling process should be the top priority and revisions would have to 
come in second place. Once in practice, Aleman's plan shifted, prioritizing revision 
                                                        
27 Ibid.,1997.  
 
28 Ibid.,1997. 
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over legalization of land titles for the poor.29 Suddenly, the position the government 
assumed questioned the legality of nearly the entire redistribution process; as well as 
rejected the peace accords signed in 1991 and 1992 through which workers of national 
enterprises had been granted prime agricultural land once belonging to the state. In 
some cases these lands would account to nearly half of the shares of the entire 
company at the moment of privatization.30  
It was more than clear that the issues regarding land tenure in Nicaragua would 
not disappear anytime soon. Even after Alemán finished his presidency, and Enrique 
Bolaños took over the executive, land conflicts were still relevant for the country. By 
2003, several groups from civil society, especially those retaining connections to the 
agricultural field, as well as former combatants, came together to open talks with the 
government in order to put an end to the land tenure issues which have had a 
significant role in making rural areas unsafe. Disputes over land increased, and so did 
the violence surrounding them as a means through which people felt entitled to protect 
their property rights in an extralegal manner31. In the following years little progress 
was accomplished as the issue of land tenure took a back seat in the agenda and other 
issues related to corruption among government officials became the focus of national 
                                                        
29 Ibid., 1997. 
 
30 Ibid.,1997.  
 
31 “Problemas de Propiedad Revientan en Todo el País,”La Prensa, July 21,2003, accessed 
January 30, 2016, http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2003/07/21/nacionales/858641-
problemas-de-propiedad-revientan-por-todo-el-pas 
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attention. With the return of the Sandinistas to power in 2007 many hoped that the 
problems related to land distribution would once again be brought to the table; despite 
of the many relief programs the Sandinista government—headed once again by Daniel 
Ortega—had, land redistribution and titling in rural areas were not given enough 
emphasis as other social and economic programs were. Nonetheless in the second 
consecutive term in power, the Sandinistas initiated new programs to provide poor 
people with legalized parcels of land. These programs have little by little begun some 
advancement in the issues facing legal tenure of land in Nicaragua.  
 
Case study: Ingenio Victoria de Julio - El Timal 
 
 
The case of Ingenio Victoria de Julio-El Timal is a well-known example of the 
property issues facing Nicaragua. The situation that evolved in El Timal provides the 
perfect scenario to analyze agrarian conflicts in the country after 1990, as it contains 
elements that were common to the national agrarian problem; in this section, the case 
of el Timal will be used as a magnifying glass to study the issues of land tenure in 
Nicaragua.  
The construction of the sugar cane mill, Victoria de Julio, began in 1982 but did 
not start operations until 198532. The sugar mill, also known by the name of El Timal, 
                                                        
32 Price Waterhouse. “Complejo Agroindustrial Azucarero de Reforma Agraria Victoria de 
Julio.” Nicaragua: Agency for International Development,1992.  
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short for Tipitapa-Río Malacatoya, was one of the most important agroindustrial 
projects of the Sandinista government. Funded by the Cuban government, El Timal 
was built on land that had been expropriated during the agrarian reform in the 1980s. 
It was made up of nearly thirty-seven properties, including some once belonging to the 
Somoza family. The sugar mill is located in the shores of Lake Xolotlán, in the outskirts 
of Managua and in the municipality of Tipitapa, and its total area accounts for 
approximately 18,171 hectares of land33. El Timal was the second largest of the seven 
sugar mills that operated in the country and was originally set up as a collective farm 
during the first Sandinista government. If something stood out of this project it was the 
level and quality of the technology that was used for sugar production. In addition to 
the cultivation and processing of sugar cane, El Timal would also be part of a 
hydroelectric project, utilizing the waters of the Malacatoya River to provide energy for 
the mill34.      
In order to be able to understand the complexity of property issues in El Timal it 
is necessary to have a clear understanding of whom the actors and what their interests 
were. Actors in this case, aside from the government, could be organized into three 
groups: the first one was made up of the former employees of the mill; the second, after 
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1991, of the demobilized combatants of the Sandinista Army and the National 
Resistance movement; and the third of former Somoza supporters whose land had 
been expropriated during the Sandinistas government35. Despite of the great 
differences between these groups, all three shared two common goals: to receive some 
kind of compensation from the government (land or money) as a result of the agrarian 
reform, and to have the government fulfill the compromises it had made with each one 
of the groups individually 36. On the other hand, the interest of the government was to 
stabilize the country after almost a decade of war, prioritizing the improvement of the 
national economy as well as the demilitarization process. As governments succeeded 
one another, the role land tenure came to have during each administration changed 
considerably. For the most part this resulted in the reversal of national policies 
implemented by previous governments, not only discarding any progress made 
towards finding a solution, but also adding up to the complexity and entanglement of 
the land tenure issues in Nicaragua.  
Post-Civil War Period (early 1990s)  
 
Until 1992, El Timal and all the other sugar mills in the country had been under 
full government control37. As part of the economic reforms that were taking place in 
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Nicaragua in order to stabilize the national economy, the Chamorro government 
decided to privatize El Timal. In 1993 the mill was sold to Noveau Latin America Ltd., 
a foreign company that would remain in control of the mill until 200038. In 1992, a year 
before the sale took place, "the Nicaraguan government agreed to allow workers of the 
mill to acquire a maximum of 25% of the property; transferring the legal rights of the 
land along with all the improvements and irrigation system to the workers; while the 
remaining land that was not purchased by the workers would be sold to private 
investors"39.  
This agreement would not have been achieved without the mounting pressure 
of sugar mill workers. They were the most important workforce for the country's 
economy in 1991, and they pressured the government to consider their situation when 
it came down to negotiating the sale of six of the seven sugar mills in the country40. The 
agreement between the government and the sugar workers, or cañeros, established a 
timetable to be used by the Chamorro government in order to carry out the 
privatization process of the sugar mills, El Timal included. When the government fell 
over three months behind the proposed schedule to begin redistributing land, workers 
were hesitant to believe the promises made by the institution. In the case of El Timal 
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some of the industrial equipment from the mill began to be sold to private actors even 
before any change in ownership could take place; furthermore, workers’ skepticism 
about the redistribution process grew stronger as the government made it very clear 
that the 25% of the land to be granted to the mill workers should, and could not affect 
the properties of those who owned the land prior to the expropriation carried out by 
the Sandinistas41.  
It is important not to leave out the role demobilization of the revolutionary and 
counter-revolutionary armies came to have in land redistribution incentives.  In the 
case of the El Timal the government also allocated part of the land to demobilized 
units, from both the resistance movement and the Sandinista military. This was part of 
the peace accords that ended the civil war in Nicaragua; the government was to 
compensate former combatants with land. In the case of many resistance fighters, this 
meant to have land returned to them confiscated by the Sandinistas in punishment for 
resisting the government. The transfer of property ownership was to be carried out 
legally. Nonetheless, the government was unable to fulfill its promises, which led to 
growing tensions, and even violence among the different groups occupying the land42. 
The situation only worsened when Doña Violeta’s government decided to implement 
revisionist policies that would, in many cases, result in the return of expropriated land 
to its original owners, who were often times Somoza supporters.  
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Out of the 186 plots of land making up El Timal, averaging one squared 
kilometer in size each, around 49 plots were or would have had to be handed back to 
former owners in the early years of the expropriation revisions43. " It was calculated 
that the land to be handed to former owners, after all revisions were finished, would 
amount to around 4,760 hectares, of which approximately 3,077 were cultivated cane 
land, for an average of 54 plots. Once privatization was completed, the cañeros would 
have access to almost 2,656 hectares of cultivated land, which would then be 
distributed among the mill workers. While this transfer of land would allow for the 
establishment of farms for self-consumption, the new owners were pushing workers to 
enter a formal contract in which they agreed to work the land as colonos and sell sugar 
to them."44 The consequences of this process were worrisome, especially in the long 
run, because such practices of agricultural production did little to move away from the 
former elite-dominated system.  
Overall, the focus points for the government regarding land tenure issues 
during this period (1990-1996) revolved around privatizing state-owned assets, 
ensuring some kind of compensation to people who had been expropriated during the 
revolution, and to a lesser extent, distributing land to some of the demobilized forces45. 
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In the case of el Timal all three policies were attempted.  
1997-2001 
 
It was clear that with the change of government, new policies regarding the 
issue of land would emerge. Arnoldo Alemán became president of Nicaragua in 1997. 
The Alemán administration took a patchwork approach to address the lack of formal 
land titles. During this period the government issued temporary documents of 
ownership as a means to circumvent the slow and ineffective titling process; 
nevertheless, these provisional documents were by no means a substitute to the actual 
property deed46. The lack of formal documentation, just as it had been with the 
previous administration, still remained one of the utmost concerns of the landless 
population. 
Very much like the previous liberal government, Alemán’s government was 
invested in revising expropriations that had been carried out before its term in power, 
consequently, pushing the cause of landless farmers and ex combatants to a secondary 
level.  The revisionist initiatives of the government became institutionalized through 
two pieces of legislation: Law 278 published in December 1997 and Law 290 published 
in June of the following year.  The former dealt with the legal recognition of some of 
the land tittles issued by previous government, as well as the establishment of a 
revision commission to deal with dubious expropriations. The latter, granted the 
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Ministry of Finance the duty of overseeing expropriation revisions, and requested the 
issuing of legal titles of all state property47.  
The issuing of these laws was extremely controversial, particularly in the case of 
Law 278, as many of its articles were considered to be unconstitutional. The law was so 
broadly written that there was no clear definition of who could be considered a 
legitimate beneficiary from the agrarian reform. The decision was the Ministry of 
Finance’s duty in each case. Furthermore, if a person did not possess a formal—
permanent or temporary—deed for his/her property, this law allowed for the 
expropriation and return of the property in favor of the state of Nicaragua. These laws 
thus deepened people’s anxieties over the security of their properties, not only by 
opening channels for new expropriations to occur, but by making the titling process 
even more complex than it had been in the past48.   
El Timal was no exception to Alemán’s revisionist policies. The president not 
only questioned the privatization of this sugar mill, along with that of other two sugar 
mills in the country, arguing that they were carried out illegally and in a corrupt 
manner; but also argued that El Timal had a growing debt of about forty million 
dollars to the state of Nicaragua; in the face of such situation the government proposed 
the eviction of all people who were currently occupying these lands as a result of the 
agrarian reform and the peace accords. The inhabitants argued that they had been 
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unable to pay for their debts because they had not managed to acquire title deeds over 
the land. Their inability to prove themselves to be the legitimate and legal owners of 
the land reduced, if not eliminated, their ability to get loans to develop and work their 
land altogether.49  Evictions from their properties became more common;50 however the 
majority of the population of El Timal remained on their land without any form of legal 
documentation certifying the ownership of the lands they inhabited.   
2002-2006 
 
Once Alemán’s presidency ended, his successor Enrique Bolaños did very little 
to ameliorate the situation in the country, despite of having experienced expropriation 
during the revolutionary period himself. In order to address the land tenure issue in el 
Timal and other areas with similar conditions, the government developed a spatial 
planning project to create a national cadaster, which included all the properties 
belonging to the state. The cadaster would work as a property bank from which the 
state could take away land and redistribute it as the government saw fit. The 
government relied heavily on military and police presence in El Timal in order to 
maintain order and avoid outbreaks of violence between the different groups making 
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up the population of the former sugar mill51.   
In 2003 the vice minister of the Interior, Alfonso Sandino, made public the 
decision of the government to relocate landless ex combatants living in El Timal to 
other parts of the country; he mentioned fifty properties of the national cadaster that 
were under revision as viable lands to be handed to them. However, he was very clear 
in stating that the lands of El Timal were not even considered as a viable option to 
relocate members of the National Resistance movement or the Sandinistas forces52. This 
decision was key in continuing the policies of eviction in El Timal the previous 
government had begun. The Bolaños administration promised the evicted people’s 
relocation would be carried out in a timeframe of twenty days53; an agreement that, 
like many others before it, never took place.   
 Bolaños’ agenda was dominated by anti-corruption initiatives and the pursuit 
of better and more democratic institutional practices that would open spaces for public 
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accountability54. Overall, this approach prioritized the resolution of conflicts within the 
political class, leaving social and economic issues nearly out of the political agenda. 
The scandals around former president Arnoldo Alemán were relevant and kept 
national institutions focused on the anti-corruption quest president Bolaños pursued. 
2007- 2016 
 
The return of the Sandinistas to power in 2007 created hope among some of the 
landless; Ortega’s plan targeted the invigoration of rural life in the country. To a large 
extent, his policies pointed toward the creation of a strong agricultural sector, similar to 
the one Nicaragua had under the Somoza dictatorship. As part of the government’s 
efforts to grow the role of agricultural output in the country’s economy, this 
government created social programs aimed at the capitalization of the rural areas of the 
country—in the pacific and northern regions of Nicaragua—as well as creation of 
public policies that not only sustain growth in the long run, but also create immediate 
and closer ties between the government and rural communities55.  
In order for the Ortega’s administration rural policies to work, the government 
needed to make significant improvements in solving the issues of land tenure in the 
country. This would prove a colossal task for the government as years of shifting 
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policies by prior governments resulted in multiple legal titles for the same property, 
the cancellation of perfectly legal property titles, and multiple compensations to former 
property owners56.  
Despite all the measures the Sandinistas have taken to overcome the problems of 
land tenure in Nicaragua, it is impossible to deny how slow official action has been in 
providing people with an effective solution to the problem. The combination of all the 
institutional disarray regarding property titles along with the lack of functional 
bureaucracies are important elements in explaining the slow progress that has been 
made. By 2008, the majority of the people occupying the lands of Victoria de Julio-El 
Timal did not have any kind of formal adjudication of the property they occupied.57 By 
2009, about 586 property titles had been given to inhabitants of El Timal, but many 
remained landless.58 What came to be an even more serious worry for the inhabitants 
of El Timal was the government's ruling that some of the property titles that had been 
issued by past governments were illegal. The government addressed this problem by 
issuing new titles retaining the same information as the previous ones, under a 
different format. However, because of their experience with land tenure issues people 
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are unable to feel secure about their land possessions, fearing invasions of other 
landless farmers/ex-combatants.59 In the years to come the resolution of the 
controversy was limited. People remained landless, and violence grew. In 2011 an 
entire family was killed as a way to settle a property conflict. Killing in El Timal occurs 
with frequency.  
However, there was one important, and probably the most relevant, victory for 
the landless inhabitants of the former mill in that same year. The Sandinista 
government restored the legality of the 1990 peace accords that had been questioned by 
all other administrations. This moment was significantly important, as it brought the 
issue of El Timal back to the table. Later that year, 4,514 titles were issued to people in 
El Timal.60 However significant these efforts have been, there is still a long way to go to 
finally resolve land conflicts in El Timal. In 2013, even after the government had begun 
to give away properties to landless farmers of El Timal, it was reported that in the 
period from January to June, seven people had been killed in the area and the causes 
were linked to property disputes.61 While the solution of land tenure issues and land 
titling might be well underway, it is imperative to consider other problems that have 
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emerged as consequences of the slow and long process of property legalization and the 
role they will come to have in the community even after full legalization of property 
titles is achieved.  
 
Conclusions: 
 
 
Land has had a particular importance in Nicaraguan history. This has to do with 
the composition of Nicaraguan economy, and the role agriculture has played as one of 
the country's largest economic sectors, and the maldistribution of ownership of the 
land. In 2014 nearly 40% of the total population in Nicaragua resided in the 
countryside; furthermore, the entire country is still largely dependent on the 
agricultural production of the rural areas, however and very ironically little attention is 
given these parts of the country.62 The lack of media coverage should not be 
understood as evidence of good and improved living conditions of the peasant 
population of Nicaragua; but rather, as highlights of the historical conditions in which 
the relations between the rural areas of the country and the national government have 
emerged.  
The agrarian reform carried out by the Sandinista government in the 1980s had a 
crucial impact in the structure of land distribution in Nicaragua. It moved away from a 
                                                        
62 María Angélica Fauné, “En la Nicaragua Campesina se han ido Acumulando Engaños, 
Decepciones y Enojos,” Envío 386, May 2014:accessed February 2, 2016, 
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4842 
 
  31 
 
 
 
very unequal system of massive concentration of land among few people, to the 
opposite: more property owners with smaller parcels of land. These changes were 
made with the idea of creating channels for sustainable development in the Nicaraguan 
countryside.63 Despite of the government's efforts to create a successful agrarian policy 
in relation to land redistribution and agricultural production, the agrarian reform was 
largely undermined by the civil war that broke out and the deteriorating economic 
conditions the country faced then. The numbers show that as early as 1994, about 14% 
of the land that had been redistributed during the revolution had already been sold off 
to private actors as a consequence of the indebtedness levels the rural population had 
acquired.64   
In the face of a dreadful economy, the Nicaraguan government, led by Violeta 
Barrios de Chamorro, took steps towards stabilization of the economy. The main policy 
of the government was to cut back on public spending. The Chamorro administration 
opted for the privatization of state-owned enterprises as one of its early steps to 
achieve economic stability. In terms of land this meant that all the property held by the 
state would be made available to private actors who were interested in buying it; 
nonetheless, in doing so the Chamorro government would have undone one of the 
most remarkable projects of its Sandinista predecessor—the redistribution of land, a 
cornerstone in the construction of a more egalitarian society. The Chamorro 
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administration understood that. Through several negotiations, including the peace 
accords in 1991 and 1992, it was agreed that workers and former combatants, both 
Sandinistas and counterrevolutionaries, along with landless peasants and former 
employees of national businesses were to be granted the right to purchase in some 
cases as much as 30%of state enterprises at the moment of privatization.   
The government made it clear that they were committed to continue the process 
the Sandinistas had begun; but that did not happen. "What has happened from the 90s 
on, could only be classified as form of structural violence to deal with the peasant 
population of Nicaragua. From the time Violeta Barrio was president, throughout late 
2000s, including the presidency of Arnoldo Alemán and Enrique Bolaños, forty-seven 
agreements were made to deal with the problems of rural property; for the most part, 
nonetheless, they were not fulfilled by the government.”65 This has resulted in the 
creation of an entrenched sense of mistrust against the government, who has done little 
to help the Nicaraguan peasantry.   
From another perspective this situation has shed light upon the weak 
democratic practices of the state. On top of slow and rather inefficient institutional 
bureaucracies that made the titling process extremely difficult and expensive66, the 
power struggles between the legislative and executive branches not only kept the 
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government from reaching a joint solution, but further politicized the issue. The 
persistence of the executive during the presidency of Alemán and Bolaños to carry out 
revisions of all the titles that had already been legalized, would eventually result in the 
collapse of the 1990-91 Peace Accords in which peasants, workers and former 
combatants gained legal rights over formerly state-owned companies.   
Additionally, Nicaragua relied—and still does—heavily on foreign help, 
especially from the United States. In the closing years of the Chamorro administration, 
the United States developed a policy that linked Nicaragua's ability to acquire aid and 
loans from institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to the land tenure issue. 
This policy came to be popularly known as "El Waiver". The logic behind this property 
waiver was to allow Nicaraguan-American citizens whose assets had been 
expropriated during the revolution to obtain some kind of compensation, either money 
or land, for the properties they had lost. In this sense, the Nicaraguan government 
faced external pressures that forced it into prioritizing expropriation cases of former 
elites rather than those of the poor rural farmers.67   
The inefficiency of the national government to respond to the needs of its rural 
constituency would lead the peasantry to take matters into their own hands. The 
fragmentation of collectively owned farms, which is the solution many farmers have 
found to provide for their need of land, was rather inevitable. In rural Nicaragua there 
was never a tradition of collectivization prior to the Sandinista agrarian reform; for the 
                                                        
67 Equipo Nitlapán-Envío, “Propiedad:El Hilo Rojo,”1997. 
 
  34 
 
 
 
average rural Nicaraguan person, life is understood in individual terms. Every 
achievement is the result of hard work and effort, whereas misfortunes are explained 
by the larger presence of a deity that puts people to test constantly.68In many ways, this 
understanding of the world, and the lack of economic resources, along with the hostile 
attitude of the government towards the peasantry have slowed down the creation of 
peasant movements that are able to effectively participate within the government to 
voice the issues important to the Nicaraguan countryside.   
The issues of land tenure have created violent and unsafe spaces for the rural 
population of the country. In the face of a state that has been unresponsive while 
dealing with countryside, and people's response in trying informally solve the problem 
themselves, Nicaragua has fallen into cycles of conflict as people feel the need to 
protect their property in any way they can. Statistics show that 1,600 criminal activities 
related to property issues took place in 1991; in 1992, the number of rearmed people in 
Nicaragua came close to 21,900, which was nearly the same amount of combatants that 
were active in 1990 before the peace accords were signed. By 1995 ex combatants began 
to rearm in different parts of the country, including the Atlantic Coast and the northern 
region of Nicaragua. In the latter case, 3000 men were mobilized and organized into 40 
different units. The government spent countless resources in demobilizing these 
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groups, who would eventually rearm to push for the resolution of land tenure issues69. 
Unfortunately this kind of situation only ends up making life unsafe for everyone and 
aggravating conflicts between the inhabitants of particular communities. This also 
creates divisions among the peasantry, who now see each other as competitors over 
limited resources.70  
 In the case of Nicaragua it is important to consider the lag in land tenure issues 
have brought to the countryside. While legalizing people’s properties should be the 
most important goal for the government, it is essential to create programs alongside 
legalization for social and economic development in order to counter the lack of 
attention given to rural communities for over two decades. These initiatives could have 
significant effects in guaranteeing people’s rights, especially women’s rights, as well as 
moving towards the development and strengthening of better farming practices 
through which peasants have access to better crops, technology and financing to 
increase their production. A comprehensive approach to land redistribution and title 
legalization that is inclusive and targets egalitarianism would be beneficial in 
providing rural movements more and effective participation in the political life of the 
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country.71  
The problem in Nicaragua has been the lack of formal, legal procedures that 
would guarantee a secure transfer of land; that is, guaranteeing the new owner all the 
rights listed under the constitution. Despite of the efforts the current Sandinista 
government is making to finally solve the problem of land tenure in the country, there 
are a couple factors that should be taken into consideration. The issues related to land 
tenure are endemic in Nicaraguan rural life; therefore, in order to reach solutions that 
can finally put an end to the problem, it is necessary for the Nicaraguan peasantry to 
assume more politically active roles within the government. Looking at a larger 
picture, moving towards the solution of this problem will be a step further in 
consolidating Nicaraguan democracy.72   
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